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 The following is a section of the second chapter of my three-chapter honors thesis, which 
I defended in March 2018 at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. In this thesis, I 
argue that Polish émigré journalists at Radio Free Europe were essential to the station’s mission 
and Polish broadcasts throughout the first part of the 1950s, culminating in the 1956 thaw. The 
first chapter focuses on how American interests gave way to Polish voices at Radio Free Europe 
throughout the early 1950s. Here, I examine the relationship between the Polish listenership and 
Polish émigré community. Establishing the importance of Polish émigré reporters to the station’s 
mission, I recreate the “information loop” through which information on life and politics in 
Poland both entered and exited the country. Turning to the June 1956 Poznań riots, the second 
chapter, which I will discuss today, argues that Polish émigré journalists and Poles in Poland 
drew on a collective national consciousness to advocate for gradual communist reform. In this 
chapter I delve into Polish fears of Soviet military intervention, noting how the Polish 
community remained apprehensive of pursuing violent revolution. I also outline the process by 
which American administrators ceded authority to Polish journalists during the riots. The third 
and final chapter focuses on how Radio Free Europe’s ‘by Poles, for Poles’ reporting policy 






The Poznań Riots 
A shrill bell pierced the early morning Poznań air on June 28, 1956. Having agreed upon the 
Stalin Locomotive Plant’s 6:30 AM siren as the signal to start their protest, workers made their 
way to the city center in droves. The trams were not running, with one striker leaving a note 
attached to the first tram scheduled to depart proclaiming “Tram drivers’ general strike. We are 
not driving today.”1 An anonymous strike committee claimed responsibility for the coordinated 
effort, with somewhere between 70 percent to 80 percent of the city’s workers protesting. 
Chanting “we want to live like human beings,” pleas for bread and freedom rang out across the 
crowd.2 The protesters attacked the jail and released prisoners, hijacked the government’s radio-
jamming headquarters, and took arms outside of the security police’s headquarters. The rioting 
did not end until the government’s infantry and tanks entered the city, killing somewhere 
between 400 and 600 of the 30,000 workers who participated in the protest.3   
 While coordinated by working-class Poles, the protests integrated disgruntled members 
from all strata of Poznań society. Official statistics from the Committee for Public Security noted 
that 79 percent of those arrested in the protest were workers, while 15 percent of those arrested 
were students. Though many were anti-communists, the protesters also included many PZPR 
members, with somewhere between 40 percent and 50 percent of party members employed in 
Poznań factories joining the strike.4  
Protesters comprised a wide-ranging swath of the population, mirroring the wide range of 
Polish Radio Free Europe listeners. It is important to consider that, just as with the Poznań riots, 
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Radio Free Europe enjoyed support from both party and non-party members. In letters to the 
station many listeners identified themselves as party members, demonstrating that there was an 
existing cohort of PZPR members protesting the government prior to Poznań.5 This was 
corroborated by a Polish soldier who defected and testified with Radio Free Europe that “the 
Communists, themselves, listen to the Western Stations.”6 Demonstrating the station’s centrality 
to daily life in Poland, this soldier noted that even though only about 10 percent of the population 
owned radios, news from RFE spread so fast that “whenever I mentioned some news item to my 
friends, they knew about it. The same was true of my parents, although they have no radios in the 
village.”7 These listener and defector testimonies serve as reminders of the centrality of Radio 
Free Europe to life in Poland. Including both average workers and PZPR members of all ages, 
the station’s listeners reflected the diverse population participating in the Poznań protest.  
 Chief among the protesters’ goals was attacking the government’s radio jamming 
equipment. This equipment was used to block RFE and other Western broadcasts from entering 
Polish airwaves. In destroying the equipment, protesters signaled their support for Western radio 
by increasing the range for RFE broadcasts. In describing the protest, station reporters noted 
broken jammers in the middle of the road, “shattered to smithereens [sic] and being trodden 
underfoot by the crowds.”8 These reporters added that some of the “most powerful” jamming 
equipment used to block “anti-regime broadcasts from Radio Free Europe” was being “hurled 
out of the windows of the radio station.”9 Disenchanted protesters viewed radio jamming as an 
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unnecessary waste of government resources. Feeling as though the money spent on radio 
jamming detracted from that available for food, one protester pointed at a destroyed jammer 
before commenting “four million złoty it cost, and I get no bread.”10 Whether out of support for 
Radio Free Europe, or just in an act of opposition to the government, the Poznań protesters 
increased the station’s broadcast range by destroying the jammers.  
American Administrator’s Initial Reaction to Poznań  
The United States and Radio Free Europe’s American leadership were initially indecisive 
on how to react to the Poznań protests. First opting to over-emphasize the protests’ revolutionary 
potential, American administrators initially intended to use the protests as a mechanism for 
rapidly securing a democratic Poland. It was only in listening to the station’s Polish reporters that 
administrators were eventually persuaded to take a more gradualist approach to Polish politics in 
the station’s broadcasting. This gradualist approach would align with the reformist policies 
supported by the Poznań protesters.11 
Upon first hearing about the protests, American administrators did not know how to 
react. Until this point, Radio Free Europe largely operated as a venue for passive resistance to the 
regime. In the face of Poznań, American administrators did not have a cohesive vision for what 
the station’s role would be during times of active resistance. The upper echelon of the station’s 
leadership asked newly appointed Station Director W.J. Conovery Egan, questioning “when do 
we cease to be a home service, a purveyor of political pep talks, etc. and become a revolutionary 
instrument?”12 Egan and other administrators wavered between supporting the protests and 
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encouraging the riots, or passively sitting back and allowing the protests to unfold. In this 
uncertainty, the station’s administration developed their response to the anti-communist action in 
real-time as the Poznań riots unfolded.  
American administrators’ initial confusion with how to manage Poznań can be explained 
by their distanced relationship with the Polish people. Throughout Spring 1956 American 
administrators focused their efforts on larger trends in Eastern Europe, concentrating station 
bandwidth on disseminating Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, which had occurred earlier that year.13 
Operating at a birds-eye view throughout the 1950s, American administrators were out of touch 
with Polish public sentiment. To this end, American leadership failed to acknowledge at least 
four workers strikes that occurred in Poland prior to those in Poznań. 14 The station did not 
publicly address nor endorse these strikes until the riots in Poznań, which were too significant to 
ignore.15 Admitting that they were “not aware” of these other strikes until Poznań, American 
administrators proved blindsided by the scope of public discontent demonstrated in the Poznań 
riots.16 It was Poznań that forced the station to pay attention to Polish public opinion at the 
ground level. In response to Poznań, American leadership released a bulletin outlining both low- 
and high-profile anti-communist protests from Siberia to East Germany from the previous three 
years.17 With this bulletin, station leadership demonstrated a renewed interest in local strikes and 
Polish public opinion. This shift demonstrated the previous distance between station 
administrators and Polish reporters, who themselves had been aware of earlier strikes but were 
not previously able to draw the administrators’ attention to them. 
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Despite an initial lack of clarity on the station’s role during protests, American leadership 
used Poznań as an opportunity to push for a “free Poland.” Viewing the destruction of jamming 
equipment as a validation of Radio Free Europe, American leadership vowed to “exploit the 
dynamic Polish justification of RFE’s existence.”18 In his first plan for the station’s response to  
Poznań, RFE Deputy Program Director Stuart L. Hannon urged the station to “endorse the 
strike” and “do everything in the scope of our imagination” to support the protests.19 Ranging 
from requests for Poland to accept American food provisions, to urging the Polish government to 
grant guarantees against brutality and hunger, Hannon and the station’s leadership aimed to place 
the station at the center of the quest for Polish liberation.20 The State Department echoed the 
station’s request, and on June 29 it determined to restore “political freedom” in Poland.21 This 
statement reinforced Hannon’s propagandistic approach toward the riots, using Poznań as the 
starting point for a broader campaign for democracy in Poland. It is only in considering the 
American administration’s initial ignorance of Polish public opinion and previous protests in 
Poland that the station’s original ad-hoc approach to promoting liberation can be considered. 
Only by listening to Polish émigré reporters did these station administrators truly begin to 
understand Polish public opinion, and thereby develop a stronger broadcasting policy following 
Poznań. 
The Munich Desk and Émigré Responses 
Witnessing the American administration’s liberation rhetoric, the Polish émigré community 
critiqued the administration’s desire to use Poznań for propaganda purposes. The émigré 
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community, including Poles at Radio Free Europe, hoped for the Poznań riots to secure reforms 
of communism. Joseph Sulkowski, a Poznań native and professor at Catholic University, wrote 
an op-ed to the New York Times criticizing the American government’s response to the Poznań 
riots. Commenting that Washington aimed to “play up the significance of the Poznań riots and to 
use them as an argument in the cold war against the Soviet Union,” Sulkowski followed that the 
State Department erroneously connected “the Poznań riots with the broader issue of liberating 
Poland and other countries from Soviet control.”22  
Many Poles, both in and outside of Poland, viewed the events in Poznań as a revolt 
against Soviet-style communism, but not as a complete rejection of Poland’s communist regime. 
One defector noted to the station that, while upset about the economic status of life in Poland, 
“Poles don't want to fight Poles, even if they hate the Communists. Maybe it would be different 
if the Russians actually occupied our country. But physically, they do not.”23 This statement 
aligned with the language of the protesters, who used mostly anti-Soviet language, instead of 
anti-communist or anti-Polish wording.24 This is significant, as it demonstrates that, while the 
Poznań protesters pushed for reform, neither Poles inside Poland nor those who had emigrated 
viewed the revolts as anti-communist. Instead, to these Poles, the revolts aimed to secure reforms 
within Polish communism and provided an opportunity to distance themselves from the Soviet 
Union. For these Poles, the riots were not the full “anti-communist” push for “political freedom” 
that the United States hoped for.25 
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Surprised by the Poznań riots, the émigré Poles at Radio Free Europe argued for a policy 
of gradualism when reporting the riots. This response aligned with that of the émigré community 
more broadly, with both Polish émigré reporters and other émigré Poles in the West advocating 
for communist reforms without an overhaul of communism itself. Polish journalists at Radio 
Free Europe remained wary of the potential for a violent armed conflict, a fact that surprised 
American administrators. Administrators questioned why the Polish journalists “asked 
themselves whether the thaw had not already gone too far; but, when after a few days, it became 
clear that the regime was yielding to demands of the people, confidence returned.”26  
It required the testimony of former Polish President Stanislaw Mikolajczyk to explain 
Polish émigré hesitancy toward hardline anticommunism to the Americans. While Mikolajczyk 
explicitly opposed communism in Poland, he represented the more pragmatic voice of Polish 
émigrés at-large to the House Committee on Un-American Activities.27 Testifying that the Polish 
people “know, however, that they have the Russians to the east, inside Poland, and in the west,” 
Mikolajczyk asserted that Polish émigrés and Poles in Poland were afraid of being invaded by 
the Soviet Union if the revolts gained more traction.28 Due to their distance from Polish public 
opinion, American administrators could not grasp the full extent of the Polish community’s fear 
of invasion. It was only through listening to émigré reporters that station administrators realized 
the extent of Polish opposition toward using the protests as a platform for full liberation.  
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As outsiders at the station, émigré sources were often unaware of the divisions between 
émigré journalists and American administrators. In testimonies with the station, these émigré 
sources shared candidly that they were wary of Soviet intervention. Prior to the events in Poznań, 
one defector noted that there were limits to Radio Free Europe’s ability to promote democracy in 
Poland. Warning the station of these limits, this defector noted “I don’t think that RFE can make 
us risk our lives.”29 While not in Poland, and therefore not facing a direct threat to his life, this 
defector’s comment points at a broader issue of Polish national consciousness. In many ways, 
these Polish émigrés shared a “community of fate” with Poles in Poland. While in some cases 
this included family and friends still in Poland, this shared fate also expanded to include a 
common national identity.30 Sharing the experiences of invasion and devastation during World 
War II, this “community of fate” cannot be ignored as a potential motivating factor behind the 
fear of conflict escalating.    
It is within this “community of fate” that Polish Desk Editor Jan Nowak lobbied on 
behalf of Polish interests during the Poznań riots. Declaring “Poles are the best experts on 
Poland,” Nowak urged American administrators to reconsider their position on Polish émigré 
input.31 While granting that the goal of “full freedom and full democracy” was noble and valid, 
Nowak maintained that this goal could only be achieved through “less propagandistic” 
messaging that prioritized the “team of exiles (…) studying daily all events and changes in their 
country.”32 The Polish “community of fate” was the natural antithesis to the American 
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propagandistic approach to liberation from communism. Rooted in Polish identity and shared 
experience, it was this community that allowed émigré journalists and sources to better 
understand the potential repercussions that could come from the Poznań riots.  
An Attentive Administration: Shift in Station Policy 
Paying closer attention to Polish public sentiment and émigré recommendations, the station’s 
administration eventually granted émigré reporters and the Munich desk more leeway in 
reporting the thaw. With Nowak, Mikolajczyk, and defector testimonies reiterating the 
importance of gradualist messaging, American administrators soon realized that the most 
promising path was one of promoting “liberalization rather than liberation.”33 Shifting from top-
down guidance to deferring to the input of émigré reporters, the American administration 
“offered tremendous leverage to those engaged in broadcasting to Poland.”34 Acknowledging the 
success of this Poles-first broadcasting method, one American administrator noted that the tone 
of scripts “was that of one who knew and understood his audience because he himself felt a 
sense of complete identification with them. These were Poles broadcasting to Poles: one cannot 
read these scripts without feeling that speaker and listener were in accord.”35 Trusting Polish 
émigrés that the best path to a free Poland was through gradual reform, the station steered away 
from programming that could promote further bloodshed.36   
American and émigré researchers partnered to produce a number of internal reports on 
the Poznań riots to inform broadcasts. These memos heavily featured anecdotes from Poles and 
excerpts from Polish media broadcasts. The main report on the protests, published almost a full 
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month after the strike, accurately reflects Poles’ dissatisfaction with Soviet-style communism, 
low wages, and poor living conditions in Poland. Signaling the Station’s deference to Polish 
sentiments, the report included quotations from the protesters themselves. Concluding that 
Poland could make a “model, independent ‘socialist’ state,” this statement reflected the station’s 
shift away from the State Department’s initial desire to use the protests to liberate Poland. 37 In 
acknowledging the potential for reformed communism in Poland, the report demonstrated the 
station’s newfound prioritization of Polish voices. 
These Polish émigré-dominated scripts enjoyed success with listeners, serving as the 
basis for a more cohesive Polish-first policy at the station. Station administration increasingly 
took note of how well émigré reporters understood Polish public opinion. With this, American 
administrators lauded the positive “effect of Poles here of [sic] American policy guidances.”38 
Seeking out more Polish sources, the Radio Free Europe’s director and deputy director urged 
lower-level American administrators to yield to Polish needs. Strongly recommending that 
reporters place “dramatic emphasis on Polish peoples [sic] demand for food,” these directives 
reflect how even upper-level administrators paid attention to Polish wishes as they coordinated 
broadcast policy.39  
When recapping the events in Poznań at the NATO Defense College, Munich-based 
American researcher Paul Henze attributed the success of the events in Poland to Polish 
nationalism. Acknowledging the Polish desire for communist reform and general distrust of the 
Soviet system, Henze noted that the “metamorphosis” in Poland was rooted in a “contagious” 
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Polish nationalism. Henze furthered that through this nationalism, “communism in Poland has 
become more Polish than communist.” 40 Henze’s use of the Poles’ nationalist reformist 
framework to discuss Poznań demonstrates the degree to which Polish philosophy permeated the 
station’s understanding of the June riots.  
Hitting at a central discussion emerging within Polish anti-Soviet dissident circles at the 
time, Henze acknowledges a Polish desire to pursue, what one Pole described as, its “own Polish 
road.”41 While this “Polish road” may not be a nationalist communist regime in the style of 
Yugoslavia, the Poznań riots reiterated the extent of Polish support for destalinization. In 
viewing these developments, American administrators at Radio Free Europe eventually ceded 
authority to Jan Nowak and Polish journalists. Opting for a policy of gradualism that provided an 
“opportunity to expand Poland’s margin of freedom,” Radio Free Europe successfully inserted 
itself into the center of conversations on communist reform in Poland.42 
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